Brexit changed the framework for the UK’s relationship with the European Union, but its measurable effects span several different areas. Trade figures show the EU remained a major UK market in 2024, while migration figures for the year ending December 2024 show a substantial shift toward non-EU+ migration and negative net migration for EU+ nationals.
Contents
- UK-EU trade in 2024
- Goods and services moved differently
- How the EU share has changed
- London and the wider UK economy
- Long-term migration in 2024
- Where migrants came from
- Reasons for non-EU+ migration
UK-EU trade in 2024
The EU continued to account for a large proportion of UK international trade in 2024. UK exports of goods and services to the EU were worth £358 billion, representing 41% of all UK exports. Imports from the EU were higher at £454 billion, equivalent to 51% of the UK total. These figures are reported in the House of Commons Library publication Statistics on UK-EU trade.
The export and import shares are not identical because the composition and value of the UK’s trade flows differ. Looking specifically at goods, the EU accounted for 48% of UK goods exports in 2024 and 54% of UK goods imports. For services, the EU accounted for 36% of UK services exports and 45% of UK services imports.
| UK-EU trade measure | 2024 figure |
|---|---|
| UK exports of goods and services to the EU | £358 billion |
| Share of all UK exports going to the EU | 41% |
| UK imports of goods and services from the EU | £454 billion |
| Share of UK imports coming from the EU | 51% |
| EU share of UK goods exports | 48% |
| EU share of UK services exports | 36% |
| EU share of UK goods imports | 54% |
| EU share of UK services imports | 45% |
The figures describe the scale of the EU relationship, not a single measure of the effect of Brexit. They also combine goods and services in the headline totals, while the separate shares show why the distinction between the two matters.
Goods and services moved differently
The House of Commons Library comparison with 2019 shows a contrasting pattern in real terms. In 2024, UK goods exports to the EU were 18% below their 2019 level. By contrast, UK exports of services to the EU were 19% above their 2019 level.
The comparison is also different outside the EU. UK exports of services to non-EU countries were 23% above their 2019 level in real terms in 2024. That gives two relevant comparisons for services: the EU was 19% above its 2019 level, while non-EU destinations were 23% above their 2019 level.
These are real-terms comparisons with 2019, so they should not be read as simple nominal cash-value changes. They also do not turn the figures into a single Brexit score. Goods exports to the EU and services exports to the EU followed different paths, and services exports to non-EU countries provide a separate benchmark.
The timing of the transition is visible in the trade series. UK goods exports to the EU fell sharply in January 2021, after the end of the Brexit transition period. The date matters because it identifies the point in the trade timeline associated with the new post-transition arrangements; it does not by itself quantify the causes of every movement in the series.
How the EU share has changed
The EU’s share of UK exports was 41% in 2024. The House of Commons Library reports that this was down from 47% in both 2010 and 2011. The change therefore concerns the share of UK exports going to the EU, rather than saying that the absolute value of exports followed the same percentage path.
The import share followed a less linear pattern in the figures provided. The EU’s share of UK imports fell to 47% in 2021 and 2022 before rising to 51% in 2024. This means the 2024 import share was higher than the two immediately preceding values, while the export share in 2024 remained below the 2010 and 2011 levels.
The goods and services breakdown adds another layer. In 2024, the EU represented 48% of UK goods exports but 36% of UK services exports. On the import side, its shares were 54% for goods and 45% for services. The EU relationship was therefore more prominent in goods trade than in services trade on both sides of the border.
Taken together, the figures show three different reference points: the current 2024 share, the earlier 2010–2011 export share, and the 2021–2022 low point for the import share. Keeping those periods separate avoids treating them as one continuous measurement.
London and the wider UK economy
London’s position provides a regional perspective. According to GLA Economics’ The impact of Brexit on London’s Economy - 2023 report, London’s total exports were worth £190 billion in 2021. Services made up 80% of London’s total exports in that year.
The destination split was also recorded separately for goods and services. In 2021, 35% of London’s goods exports went to the EU, while 38% of its service exports went to the EU. For the UK as a whole, 47% of goods exports and 36% of service exports went to the EU in 2021.
| 2021 export measure | London | UK |
|---|---|---|
| Goods exports going to the EU | 35% | 47% |
| Service exports going to the EU | 38% | 36% |
GLA Economics also reported that UK firms’ outward investment transactions to the EU27 increased by 17% to £21.2 billion. The source’s measure is outward investment transactions, and the reported period is the one covered by that finding; it should not be substituted for a stock of investment or for exports.
The report stated that London ran a trade surplus with both the EU and the rest of the world. It also reported that London’s ratio of exports to gross value added was around one-third in 2017. That ratio uses a different year from the 2021 export totals, so the two measurements should remain distinct.
For services, the same GLA Economics report said that over 60% of UK service exports to both the EU and the rest of the world did not involve movement of people before the pandemic. In 2020, 31% of service exports to the EU were provided by subsidiaries, compared with 67% of service exports to the rest of the world. These figures describe how services were delivered, not the total value of those exports.
Long-term migration in 2024
The Office for National Statistics publication Long-term international migration, provisional recorded long-term net migration of 431,000 in the year ending December 2024. This was down from 860,000 in the year ending December 2023.
The underlying flows were also different between the two periods. Total long-term immigration was 948,000 in the year ending December 2024, compared with 1,326,000 in the year ending December 2023. Total long-term emigration was 517,000 in the year ending December 2024, compared with 466,000 in the year ending December 2023.
The 2024 figures are provisional ONS estimates. The immigration, emigration and net migration measures refer to long-term movement and to the year ending December 2024, rather than to a calendar-year count of every border crossing.
The nationality breakdown shows how the balance was formed. Non-EU+ nationals accounted for 81% of total immigration and 43% of total emigration in the year ending December 2024. EU+ nationals accounted for 13% of immigration and 42% of emigration. British nationals accounted for 6% of immigration and 15% of emigration.
The corresponding counts were 766,000 non-EU+ immigrants, 122,000 EU+ immigrants and 60,000 British immigrants. Emigration consisted of 222,000 non-EU+ nationals, 218,000 EU+ nationals and 77,000 British nationals.
Where migrants came from
The ONS figures give a different net migration result for each nationality grouping. Non-EU+ net migration was positive 544,000 in the year ending December 2024. EU+ net migration was negative 96,000, while British national net migration was negative 17,000.
The negative EU+ figure reflects the relationship between the EU+ immigration and emigration counts in that period: 122,000 EU+ nationals immigrated long-term and 218,000 emigrated long-term. For British nationals, the corresponding figures were 60,000 and 77,000. These are the reported flows and balances for the period, not forecasts.
Non-EU+ immigration fell by 366,000, or 32%, between the year ending December 2023 and the year ending December 2024. Even after that fall, non-EU+ nationals accounted for 81% of total immigration in the latest provisional estimate.
The nationality categories are useful for describing the migration pattern, but they should not be confused with reasons for travel. The ONS source reports both dimensions separately: nationality group and the stated reason associated with particular non-EU+ arrivals.
Reasons for non-EU+ migration
Among non-EU+ nationals in the year ending December 2024, 266,000 came to the UK for study-related reasons. A further 262,000 came for work-related reasons. The same ONS publication recorded 95,000 arrivals for asylum-related reasons, 76,000 for family reasons and 51,000 on humanitarian routes.
These reason-specific figures should be read as separate reported counts. They identify the recorded reason for the non-EU+ arrivals described by the ONS and do not provide a complete explanation for the movement of every nationality group.
The emigration data also include an important study-related measure. In the year ending December 2024, 135,000 non-EU+ nationals who originally arrived on study-related visas emigrated long-term. This was equal to 61% of all non-EU+ long-term emigration.
That statistic links an original visa route with a later long-term emigration outcome. It does not mean that 61% of all non-EU+ immigrants left the UK, because the denominator is all non-EU+ long-term emigration in the stated period. Keeping the denominator explicit is essential when interpreting the migration figures.
The trade and migration statistics therefore describe distinct parts of the UK-EU relationship. In 2024, the EU remained responsible for 41% of UK exports and 51% of UK imports by the combined goods-and-services measures reported by the House of Commons Library. In the year ending December 2024, ONS provisional estimates recorded 431,000 long-term net migration, with positive non-EU+ net migration alongside negative EU+ net migration.