Brexit changed the rules governing the UK’s relationship with the European Union, while its effects appear differently across trade, migration, productivity and the wider balance of payments. The figures below separate official estimates from forecasts and assumptions, and identify the relevant measurement period.
Contents
- Brexit and productivity
- Trade with the EU
- Goods, services and trading partners
- Migration after the new visa system
- Recent migration estimates
- Revisions to migration statistics
Brexit and productivity
The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) uses a long-run comparison with a hypothetical UK that remained in the EU. Its Brexit trade forecast assumptions are not a measurement of a single year’s loss; they are a modelled path for the eventual effect of lower trade intensity.
The OBR assumes that, in the long run, UK imports will be 15% lower than they would have been if the UK had remained in the EU. It makes the same 15% long-run assumption for UK exports. The OBR assumes that this reduction in trade intensity lowers potential productivity by 4%.
The OBR assumes the full productivity effect takes 15 years to be felt. In its Brexit analysis, it said around one-third of the long-run productivity effect was already visible in the data. Its productivity impact box estimated that Brexit had already reduced UK productivity by 1.4 percentage points by the time of that updated analysis. These figures describe an OBR analysis and assumptions rather than a directly observed counterfactual outcome.
The OBR also forecast a temporary 0.5% hit to GDP at the start of 2021 from Brexit-related disruption. In a cited external estimate, the OBR said UK goods trade was reduced by 15.8% as of August 2021. The two figures concern different measures and dates: the first is a forecast of a temporary GDP effect, while the second is an external estimate of goods-trade reduction.
Trade with the EU
The EU remains a major trading partner in the latest House of Commons Library figures. UK exports of goods and services to the EU were £358 billion in 2024, equal to 41% of all UK exports. UK imports from the EU were £454 billion, or 51% of all UK imports.
The composition of trade matters. In real terms in 2024, UK goods exports to the EU were 18% below their 2019 level. UK goods exports to non-EU countries were also below 2019, but by 14%. Services exports moved in the other direction: UK services exports to the EU were 19% above their 2019 level, while services exports to non-EU countries were 23% above their 2019 level. These comparisons use 2019 as the reference year and distinguish goods from services.
The EU accounted for 48% of UK goods exports and 36% of UK services exports in 2024. On the import side, the EU accounted for 54% of UK goods imports and 45% of UK services imports. The same House of Commons Library statistics show that the EU accounted for 47% of UK exports in 2010 and 2011.
The EU’s share of UK imports was between 50% and 53% from 2010 to 2020. It fell to 47% in 2021 and 2022, before rising to 51% in 2024. Shares can change because of movements in trade with the EU, movements in trade with other countries, or both; they are not the same as the value of trade.
| Measure | EU share or value | Period | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| UK exports of goods and services to the EU | £358 billion | 2024 | House of Commons Library, Statistics on UK-EU trade |
| EU share of all UK exports | 41% | 2024 | House of Commons Library, Statistics on UK-EU trade |
| UK imports of goods and services from the EU | £454 billion | 2024 | House of Commons Library, Statistics on UK-EU trade |
| EU share of all UK imports | 51% | 2024 | House of Commons Library, Statistics on UK-EU trade |
| EU share of UK goods exports | 48% | 2024 | House of Commons Library, Statistics on UK-EU trade |
| EU share of UK services exports | 36% | 2024 | House of Commons Library, Statistics on UK-EU trade |
Goods, services and trading partners
The ONS UK trade core statistics book reports UK total trade of £1.9 trillion in 2025. Total trade with the EU was £859.5 billion, compared with £1,039.1 billion with non-EU countries. The United States accounted for 17.5% of UK total trade, or £331.5 billion, in 2025.
The 2025 balance differed sharply by type of trade. The UK had a goods trade deficit of £242.3 billion and a services trade surplus of £203.2 billion. It had a trade deficit with the EU of £88.7 billion, while it recorded a trade surplus with non-EU countries of £50.3 billion.
For the 12 months ending March 2026, the ONS again reported UK total trade of £1.9 trillion. That figure was 3.7% higher than in the previous 12 months. Over the same period, the goods trade deficit was £253.3 billion and the services trade surplus was £209.9 billion. The UK had a trade deficit with all countries of £43.4 billion.
Longer-run ONS series provide context for these balances. The UK has run a trade deficit in every year since 1998 except 2020 and 2021. It has run a trade in goods deficit in every year since 1983, while it has run a trade in services surplus in every year since 1966. These historical patterns predate Brexit and should not be treated as Brexit-only measures.
The ONS also reported that the UK’s EU trade deficit increased from 1.1% of GDP in the first quarter of 2010 to 4.5% of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2023. The House of Commons Library reported an overall UK trade deficit of £39 billion in 2025. Its current account deficit was £74 billion in 2025, down from £86 billion in 2024, and equalled 2.4% of GDP in 2025, down from 3.0% in 2024.
Migration after the new visa system
Brexit changed the immigration system as well as the trading relationship. In its March 2023 Economic and fiscal outlook, the OBR said the new post-Brexit immigration system issued 800,000 visas in its first year. Of those, 50,000 were for EU citizens who would not have needed visas under the previous regime.
The OBR’s Brexit forecasting assumptions show how its migration expectations changed. In November 2022, it revised its steady-state migration assumption up to 205,000, and later raised that assumption to 245,000. These are steady-state assumptions used in forecasting, not counts of migration in a particular year.
The OBR said net migration was 504,000 in the year to June 2022. It described that as twice the average annual level between 2010 and 2020 and more than triple its initial long-run assumption for the new visa regime. In the same analysis, the OBR said EU net migration had turned negative under the new regime and stood at -50,000 in 2022.
Recent migration estimates
The ONS’s provisional long-term international migration estimates for the year ending December 2025 put total long-term net migration at 171,000. The ONS said this had nearly halved from 331,000 in the year ending December 2024.
The 2025 estimate breaks down into different nationality and residence groupings. Non-EU+ net migration was 350,000, down by 161,000 from 511,000 a year earlier. British nationals’ net migration was -136,000, while EU+ net migration was -42,000.
Total long-term immigration was estimated at 813,000 in the year ending December 2025, a 20% decrease from 1,012,000 in the year ending December 2024. The ONS said long-term immigration peaked at 1,469,000 in March 2023. Immigration and net migration are different measures: net migration accounts for both immigration and emigration.
| ONS measure | Estimate | Reference period |
|---|---|---|
| Long-term net migration | 171,000 | Year ending December 2025 |
| Non-EU+ net migration | 350,000 | Year ending December 2025 |
| British nationals’ net migration | -136,000 | Year ending December 2025 |
| EU+ net migration | -42,000 | Year ending December 2025 |
| Total long-term immigration | 813,000 | Year ending December 2025 |
| Long-term immigration peak | 1,469,000 | March 2023 |
The negative figures for British nationals and EU+ mean that estimated emigration exceeded estimated immigration for those groups during the stated period. They do not mean that all migration was negative, because non-EU+ net migration remained positive at 350,000.
Revisions to migration statistics
The ONS publication on improving long-term international migration statistics revised earlier estimates. Across the years ending December 2021 through December 2024, it revised cumulative net migration down by around 97,000. The revisions were not uniform across components.
Over the same period, the ONS revised British nationals’ net migration down by 344,000. It revised British nationals’ net migration to -114,000 for the year ending December 2024 and revised British nationals’ emigration to 257,000 for that year.
The ONS revised EU+ net migration for the year ending December 2024 to -69,000. The previously published figure for that period was -96,000. It also revised cumulative immigration upward by 316,000 and cumulative emigration upward by 413,000 across the years ending December 2021 to December 2024.
These revisions show why migration statistics should be read with their release status and reference period. The December 2025 figures are provisional estimates, while the earlier figures include revisions to previously published estimates. A revised series can change the level or direction of a comparison without changing the period being measured.